

















¤The research reported in the present paper started while Tatsuro Ichiishi was visiting
_ Iktisat BÄ olÄ umÄ u (Department of Economics), Bilkent Ä Universitesi in the Fall Semester,
1997. The authors would like to thank Murat Sertel for his suggestions and comments,
and Bilkent University for making this collaborative work possible. Tatsuro Ichiishi would
also like to thank the people of Bilkent for their warm hospitality throughout his stay in
Ankara.
1Tel.: +1-614-292-0762; FAX: +1-614-292-3906; email: ichiishi@economics.sbs.ohio-
state.edu
2Tel. +90-312-290-4000, ext 1880; FAX: +90-312-266-5140; email:
ksemih@bilkent.edu.tr
1Abstract
A version of Spence's \job market" model is constructed and stud-
ied: There are two groups of individuals, the job applicants (the in-
formed), and the incumbents (the uninformed). The applicants have
private information about their types, and their actions (choice of ed-
ucation levels) serve as messages. The incumbents (employers) have
only one type, and are endowed with di®erentiated information struc-
tures on actions of the informed. A contract is a pair of an education
level and a wage level, and a wage schedule speci¯es a contract for each
education level. The incumbent set is ¯nite, and is ¯xed throughout
the analysis (so free entry/exit is excluded). The paper studies endoge-
nous determination of the wage schedules o®ered by the incumbents.
The applicants behave noncooperatively. Two equilibrium concepts
are proposed: a noncooperative equilibrium, a version of the Nash
equilibrium which postulates noncooperative and passive behavior of
the incumbents, and a cooperative equilibrium, a version of the strong
equilibrium which postulates cooperative and passive behavior of the
incumbents. It is shown that a cooperative equilibrium does not exist.
By studying noncooperative equilibria, which do exist in many cases,
it is concluded that it is not the informational advantage (de¯ned as
the abundance of measurable sets), but rather possession of the right
information (in the sense that it best serves the needs of applicants)
that enables an incumbent to win.
21 INTRODUCTION
The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with
the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus
of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these is-
sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially
reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's)
optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') re-
sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic se-
tups characterized by di®erent relationships among decision-makers.
A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete in-
formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more impor-
tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies.
See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formula-
tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996)
for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi,
Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deter-
mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and
Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a speci¯c model of Chandler's ¯rm
in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent
work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part
in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract.
The present paper provides an analysis of the role of asymmetric infor-
mation, given yet another player relationship: We retain the principal-agent
relationship, but allow for several principals in addition to several agents.
Interaction of the principals is a focus of the paper. It is true that the
traditional principal-agent literature frequently postulates existence of many
principals, in fact in¯nitely many potential principals as required by the pure
competition assumption (speci¯cally, by the free entry and exit assumption),
but this assumption in a nutshell reduces the model to the one-principal case
in which the principal's only economically feasible strategy is the competitive
strategy; this point was emphasized in Ichiishi (1997, Sections 7.4 and 7.6).
Given a multi-principal, multi-agent setup, we intend to study the roles of
incomplete information about exogenous data and of incomplete information
about endogenous variables. A general theory is yet to be developed, and our
work reported in this paper is modest: As the ¯rst step towards a healthy
general theory, we construct and study a very speci¯c model, a variant of
3Spence's (1974) education model. There are two groups of individuals, the
job applicants (the informed), and the incumbents (the uninformed). The
applicants have private information about their types (productivity levels),
and their actions (choice of education levels) serve as messages to the incum-
bents. The incumbents (employers) have only one type, have no information
about applicants' types, only partially observe applicants' actions, and their
strategies are to determine wage schedules. We are following Spence in mod-
elling incomplete information about exogenous data, namely about types
of applicants. Our modelling of incomplete information about endogenous
variables, namely about applicants' actions, on the other hand, is quite dif-
ferent from the way the traditional literature on moral hazard has modelled
unobservability, but is suited to the nature of the present setup.
In our model, the principals are the incumbents, and the agents are the
job applicants. The game is played in the following sequence: (1) Each
incumbent ¯rst designs a wage schedule as his strategy. (2) Each applicant
then chooses an education level, and (3) ¯nally chooses the best contract
for him. Anticipating optimal reactions of the applicants in (2) and (3), the
incumbents play a game in the above stage (1) (called the ¯rst-stage game).3
We analyze the ¯rst-stage game; analysis of the subsequent stages is trivial.
We consider two situations: one in which the incumbents behave non-
cooperatively and passively, and the other in which the incumbents behave
cooperatively and passively. Associated with each situation, we propose an
equilibrium concept: a noncooperative equilibrium, a version of the Nash
equilibrium for the noncooperative behavioral principle, and a cooperative
equilibrium, a version of the strong equilibrium for the cooperative behavioral
principle. Our ¯rst observation is negative: a cooperative equilibrium does
not exist. On the other hand, we obtain positive results on noncooperative
equilibria; they do exist in many cases. By studying typical noncooperative
equilibria, we conclude that it is not the informational advantage (de¯ned as
the abundance of measurable sets), but rather possession of the right infor-
mation (in the sense that it best serves the needs of applicants) that enables
an incumbent to win.
The negative result on a cooperative equilibrium is analogous to the
3Our theory in the present paper is in line with the mechanism theory, which postulates
that the uninformed move ¯rst and the informed move second, rather than the signalling
game, which postulates that the informed move ¯rst and the uninformed move second.
4nonexistence of a strong equilibrium in the prisoner's dilemma game. As
Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) stressed, this is due to the very structure of the
model (which is simplistic). For a cooperative equilibrium to exist, there
have to be merits of coordination of strategies. Let F S be the set of all feasi-
ble strategies available to coalition S, coordinated and uncoordinated. There
would be merits if F S strictly contains
Q
j2S Fj. Roughly stated, however,
our present model postulates that F S is identical to
Q
j2S Fj (apart from the
informational aspect), as in the prisoner's dilemma game, hence the nonexis-
tence result. There are countless situations in the real economy in which the
above strict inclusion holds true (including the basic situations, like the pure
exchange economy). We expect that future research will establish positive
results on a cooperative equilibrium, given such situations.
Our conclusion that possession of the right information enables an incum-
bent to win appears to be robust. We expect that this can be taken as one
of the general principles that prevail in most models.
2 MODEL
The player set consists of the applicants, who ¯rst go through education and
then look for a job, and the incumbents, who o®er jobs to applicants.
There are two types of applicants, type L (low quality) and type H (high
quality). An applicant's type is his private information. An applicant of type
t, when employed by an incumbent, brings in to the employer the marginal
revenue rt, t = L;H. Denote by M the set of possible education levels;
for simplicity, we assume that M = [0; m], a nondegenerate interval. A
pair (m;w) 2 M £ R+ then signi¯es the education level and the wage level
of an applicant; the pair is called a contract. The preference relation of an
applicant of type t is de¯ned on the contract space M£R+, and is represented
by a continuous utility function u(¢ j t) : M £ R+ ! R, which is decreasing
in m 2 M and is increasing in w 2 R+. We postulate that each applicant
has a reservation wage level, w, that is, he will leave this \job market"4 if no
incumbent o®ers a job with a wage greater than or equal to w; for simplicity
we assume that this level is the same regardless of a type and also regardless
of an education level. Since any contract (m;w) gives the worst utility level,
4Although we adopt the conventional terminology of \job market" for convenience, the
game played by the applicants and the incumbents is far from the neoclassical market.
5for any contract (m;w) such that w > w, there exists w0 > w such that
u(0;w0 j t) = u(m;w j t). We postulate
0 · w < rL < rH:
We also postulate that the high-quality applicant can endure education more
than the low-quality applicant. This is precisely formulated by the assump-
tion that at any contract (m;w) for which w > w, the slope of the indi®erence
curve of the type-H applicants is lower than that of the type-L applicants.
In the case u(¢ j t) is di®erentiable, it means that the high-quality applicant's
marginal rate of substitution of wage for education is lower than that of the
low-quality applicant:
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There are nt applicants of type t. Set n := nL + nH.
Let I be the ¯nite set of incumbents. An applicant's education level may
serve as a signal of his type, hence set M is considered a message space. How-
ever, each incumbent can observe messages only imperfectly. While he may
discern a college graduate from a high school graduate, he may not be able
to discern di®erent intensities of the education that two college graduates
have gone through. On the other hand, he may be able to discern di®erent
intensities, perhaps due to the personal contact he has with the faculty of a
college. Thus two incumbents may have di®erent abilities to discern educa-
tion levels. Incumbent i's discerning ability is formulated as an information
structure, formally de¯ned as a ¯nite algebra Mi on M; incumbent i can
discern education levels m and m0, i® there exists A 2 Mi for which m 2 A
and m0 62 A. For simplicity we assume that each minimal member of Mi
is of the form, [m; m0), a half-closed and half-open interval in M, in case
m0 6= m, or of the form [m00;m].
3 ENDOGENOUS DETERMINATION OF
WAGE SCHEDULES
We analyze the \job market" in which (1) each incumbent i ¯rst decides
either to stay in the \market" or to quit, and if he stays, he announces a
6wage schedule, gi : M ! R+, which o®ers a job with wage level gi(m) to
the applicants of every possible education level m, (2) each applicant j then
chooses his education level ~ m 2 M, and (3) applicant j accepts a job from
among those o®ered to the applicants of his education level, thereby choosing
his wage level from fgi(~ m)gi2I+, where I+ is the set of all incumbents who
stay in the \job market." A wage schedule is considered a mechanism.
The applicants behave noncooperatively in the above stages (2) and (3)
as the Stackelberg followers. The incumbents are the Stackelberg leaders:
Anticipating optimal reactions of the applicants, the incumbents play a game
(with the player set I) in the above stage (1); this game will henceforth be
called the ¯rst-stage game. We will analyze two situations: one in which
the incumbents also behave noncooperatively, and the other in which the
incumbents behave cooperatively, that is, they may merge into a larger ¯rm
and jointly design their mechanism. The overall game is, therefore, a speci¯c
instance of a multi-principal, multi-agent problem.
Our main focus here is analysis of the ¯rst-stage game. The subsequent
subgame played by the applicants, (2) and (3), is trivial. Indeed, if each
remaining incumbent i (2 I+) chooses a wage schedule gi, then the applicants
of type t choose education level mt and sign the employment contract with




























A strategy of incumbent i in the ¯rst-stage game is a wage-schedule gi :
M ! R+. It is feasible if it takes the same value for any two undiscernible
messages, that is, if it is Mi-measurable. It keeps the applicants in the \job
market" if the o®ered wages are no lower than the reservation wage, that
is, if gi(m) ¸ w for all m 2 M. An outcome of a strategy bundle fgigi2I+
7is the applicants' strategy-choice in the subgame (2) and (3) in accordance
with the o®ered wage schedules fgigi2I+; it is the education level ~ mt and the
number ni
t of applicants of type t who accept a contract with incumbent i,
t 2 fL;Hg; i 2 I+. The 2#I+ nonnegative integers fni
L;ni
Hgi2I+ are called
















If i anticipates in the ¯rst-stage game that his gain will be negative, he will
change his strategy, or else quit from the \job market." Prospect for a gain
thus endogenously determines the set I+ of incumbents in the \market." The
prospect in turn is determined by strategies currently chosen by the other
incumbents. We postulate that when behaving noncooperatively, each in-
cumbent is passive vis-µ a-vis the other incumbents' strategy-choice. Given a
strategy bundle fgigi2I with the associated assignment fni
L;ni
Hgi2I, incum-
bent i is called active if ni
L > 0 or ni
H > 0. A noncooperative equilibrium of




² each mechanism g¤i is feasible, keeps the applicants in the \job market,"
and receives a nonnegative gain; and
² it is not true that there is an incumbent who can improve upon the
outcome of fg¤igi2I, that is, it is not true that there are incumbent
j 2 I and his feasible strategy gj : M ! R+ such that j remains active





and such that denoting by I+ the set of the incumbents remaining in the
\market," j's gain from the remaining strategy bundle fgj;fg¤igi2I+nfjgg
is greater than his gain from the outcome of the strategy bundle fg¤igi2I.
As an alternative to the passive noncooperative behavior of the incum-
bents, we also model a passive cooperative behavior. Denote by I the family
of nonempty coalitions of incumbents, 2I n f;g. A coalition structure is a
partition of I. The members of a coalition T jointly design a mechanism
gT : M ! R+; in so doing, they can pool their private information, so gT is
feasible if it is
W
i2T Mi-measurable. Suppose coalition structure P is realized
and each coalition T 2 P chooses a wage schedule gT. The applicants then
play the subsequent subgame, in accordance with the most advantageous
8schedule,
W
T2P gT. The outcome in turn determines a gain of each coalition
in P. As a part of the ¯rst-stage game, the members of a coalition in P agree
in the ¯rst stage on distribution of the anticipated coalitional gain among
themselves. A cooperative equilibrium of the ¯rst-stage game is a triple of
a coalition structure P¤, a #P¤-tuple of mechanisms fg¤TgT2P¤, and a gain
distribution among the incumbents f¼¤igi2I, such that
² for each realized coalition T 2 P¤, its mechanism g¤T is feasible and
keeps the applicants in the \job market," and the nonnegative gain
distribution is feasible, that is, ¼¤i ¸ 0, and
P
i2T ¼¤i is less than or
equal to T's coalitional gain; and
² it is not true that there is a coalition of incumbents which can improve
upon the gain distribution f¼¤igi2I, that is, it is not true that there are
coalition S 2 I, its feasible strategy gS : M ! R+ and its feasible gain
distribution f¼igi2S, such that ¼i > ¼¤i for every i 2 S.
Here, the second equilibrium condition (the coalitional stability condition)
is ambiguous, and there are actually many precise versions. The ambiguity
arises, because in analyzing the e®ects of a deviating coalition, we need to
specify actions of the non-deviating incumbents: We postulate that when
behaving cooperatively, the members of each coalition is passive vis-µ a-vis
the other coalitions' strategy-choice. The members of a deviating coalition
S perceive, therefore, that those coalitions T in P¤ that do not lose their
members to S (those T 2 P¤ for which T
T
S = ;) keep the same strategies
g¤T. We need to specify, however, strategies chosen by the incumbents who
lose some colleagues to S (for the coalitions T n S for T 2 P¤ for which
; 6= T nS 6= T, we need to specify their strategies perceived by the members
of S). There are many speci¯cations, hence many versions of the coalitional
stability condition. One scenario for the deviating coalition S's perception
is that for each T 2 P¤, the members of T who are left behind at the time
of formation of S stay together afterwards, that is, the coalition structure
fSg
S
fT n S j T 2 P¤; T n S 6= ;g is realized as a result of formation of
S, and that, for each T 2 P¤ for which T n S 6= ;, the coalition of the
remaining players T nS keep choosing g¤T as its feasible strategy, since each
member in T n S has learnt the information structure
W
i2T Mi through the
earlier cooperation of the members of T. The gain of each coalition that












There are other scenarios; in particular, we may allow some incumbents to
leave the \job market," as we did in formulating the noncooperative equilib-
rium. It will turn out that the results on the cooperative equilibrium in this
paper are obtained for a wide class of scenarios. The only postulate we make
is:
² Suppose that each coalition T in the prevailing coalition structure P¤
is choosing strategy g¤T, and that coalition S is formed against P¤ and
chooses strategy gS. Then, coalition S can attract all the applicants
who have education level m, only if gS(m) >
W
T2P¤:TnS6=;g¤T(m).
In the following analysis, we will concentrate on the nontrivial case of
multi-principals, #I ¸ 2. In the trivial case of #I = 1, say I = fig, the
wage schedule g¤i : m 7! w is an equilibrium.
We ¯rst state a basic negative result on the cooperative equilibrium:
PROPOSITION 3.1 Assume #I ¸ 2. If the grand coalition I and the
singleton coalitions can form, then there is no cooperative equilibrium.
The rest of this section is devoted to study of the noncooperative equilib-
rium. We establish existence results for several cases by constructing speci¯c
noncooperative equilibria. The speci¯c formula of equilibria provides an in-
sight into the role that information structures Mi, i 2 I, play in the \job
market."
De¯ne w0 2 R+ by
nL (rL ¡ w0) + nH (rH ¡ w0) = 0;
and let UH0 be the indi®erence curve of the type-H applicants that passes
through the contract (0;w0). See ¯gure 1.
Insert ¯gure 1 here.
10Let Ut be an indi®erence curve of the type-t applicants t = H;L. By abuse
of notation, Ut and rt also denote the functions from M to R+ whose graphs
are Ut and the horizontal line of height rt, respectively. Thus, (m;w) 2
Ut i® w = Ut(m). The function UL
V




For h = 1;2;..., de¯ne mh 2 M so that [0; mh) is the hth smallest non-
degenerate interval that can be distinguished by some incumbents. Clearly,
0 < m1 < m2 < ...:
For each h, choose wL;h and wH;h so that
nL (rL ¡ wL;h) + nH (rH ¡ wH;h) = 0
u(0;wL;h j L) = u(mh;wH;h j L):
The pair (wL;h;wH;h) is uniquely determined. Denote by UL;h the indi®erence
curve of the type-L applicants that passes through (0;wL;h) and (mh;wH;h).
Denote also by UH;h the indi®erence curve of the type-H applicants that
passes through (mh;wH;h). See ¯gure 2. Let Ih be the set of all incumbents
who can distinguish the interval [0; mh); Ih := fi 2 I j [0; mh) 2 Mig.
Insert ¯gure 2 here.
Let k be the positive integer for which u(mk;wH;k j H) is the highest,
that is,
u(mk;wH;k j H) ¸ u(mh;wH;h j H); for all h:
If there is a tie, choose k so that wL;k is the highest among such maximizers
of u(mh;wH;h j H) (or equivalently, mk is the smallest among such maximiz-
ers). For the required characterizations, we need to consider several mutually
exclusive and exhaustive cases:
Case (1): wH;k · UH0(mk),
Case (2): rH ¸ wH;k > UH0(mk),
Case (3): rH < wH;k, and wH;k > UH0(mk).
11Notice that wL;k ¸ rL (wL;k < rL, resp.) in case (2) (in case (3), resp.).
THEOREM 3.2 Assume #I ¸ 2, and consider case (1). Strategy bundle
fg¤igi2I is a noncooperative equilibrium, if
g
¤i(m) = w0; for all i 2 I and all m 2 M:
Any assignment fni
L;ni
Hgi2I may prevail with this equilibrium, provided that
the gain of each incumbent is zero,
n
i
L(rL ¡ w0) + n
i
H (rH ¡ w0) = 0; for all i 2 I:
Case (2) is divided into three subcases:
Subcase (2.1): #Ik ¸ 2,
Subcase (2.2): #Ik = 1, say Ik = fikg, there is a tie in obtain-
ing maxh u(mh;wH;h j H), that is, there is k0 (6= k) such that
u(mk0;wH;k0 j H) = u(mk;wH;k j H), and for at least one such k0,
Ik0 n fikg 6= ;,
Subcase (2.3): #Ik = 1, say Ik = fikg, and for any i 2 I n fikg
and any h for which Ih 3 i, u(mh;wH;h j H) < u(mk;wH;k j H).
See ¯gure 3.
Insert ¯gure 3 here.
THEOREM 3.3 Consider subcase (2.1). Then, feasible strategy bundle








(¢); for all i 2 I;





wL;k if m = 0
wH;k if m = mk:
Given this fg¤igi2I, the applicants of type L sign the contract (0;wL;k), and
the applicants of type H sign the contract (mk;wH;k). Any assignment (ni
L;ni
H)
may prevail to those incumbents i 2 Ik for whom g¤i(0) = wL;k and g¤i(mk) =
wH;k, provided that i's gain is zero, i.e., ni
L=ni
H = nL=nH.
12THEOREM 3.4 Consider subcase (2.2). Feasible strategy bundle fg¤igi2I












wL;k if m = 0
wH;k if m = mk;
and for some k0 (6= k) for which u(mk0;wH;k0 j H) = u(mk;wH;k j H),
9 i




wL;k if m = 0
wH;k0 if m = mk0:
Given this fg¤igi2I, the applicants of type L sign ik's contract (0;wL;k), and
the applicants of type H sign ik's contract (mk;wH;k).
For subcase (2.3), let l be any positive integer such that u(ml;wH;l j H) is
the highest level achievable by the incumbents other than ik, i.e.,
u(ml;wH;l j H) = max fu(mh;wH;h j H) j Ih n fikg 6= ;g;
and denote by UH;l the indi®erence curve of the type-H applicants that passes
through (ml;wH;l). For each h, let U0
L;h be the indi®erence curve of the type-L




L;h be the indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants that passes through
(0;max frL;w0
L;hg). See ¯gure 4. Let Jik be the set of all integers h such that
the interval [0;mh) is discernable to incumbent ik, fh j Ih 3 ikg. We are going
to compare mechanisms parameterized by h 2 Jik, so that the mechanism
for h is intended to o®er contract (0;max frL;w0
L;hg) to type-L applicants
and contract (mh;UH;l(mh)) to type-H applicants. Let k¤ 2 Jik be the
parameter that maximizes ik's gain, of all such parameterized mechanisms:
the parameter k¤ solves
Maximize nL
³




+ nH (rH ¡ UH;l(mh));








Insert ¯gure 4 here.
13THEOREM 3.5 Assume #I ¸ 3, and consider subcase (2.3). Assume that
there exists an integer p for which mk¤ · mp, and Ip n fikg 6= ;. Feasible















Lg if m = 0
UH;l(mk¤) if m = mk¤;




Lg if m = 0
UH;l(mp) if m = mp;
and
9 i
0 2 I n fik;ipg : g
¤i0
(m) = rL for all m 2 M:
Given this fg¤igi2I, the applicants of type L sign ik's contract (0;max frL;w0¤
Lg),
and the applicants of type H sign ik's contract (mk¤;HH;l(mk¤)).





wL;k if 0 · m < mk
wH;k if mk · m:
In subcase (2.2), incumbent ik seemingly has a strict informational advantage




wL;k0 if 0 · m < mk
wH;k if mk · m;
he could not separate applicants of di®erent types (all applicants would sign





L;kg if 0 · m < mk
UH;l(mk) if mk · m:
The equilibrium of Theorem 3.2 is a pooling equilibrium. The equilibria of
Theorems 3.3-3.5 are separating equilibria.
14In order to analyze case (3), de¯ne for each h = 1;2;...,
wH;h := min frH;wH;hg;
wL;h := max frL;wL;hg;
and denote by UH;h (UL;h, resp.) the indi®erence curve of the type-H ap-
plicants (of the type-L applicants, resp.) that passes through (mh;wH;h)
(through (0;wL;h), resp.) Notice that wH;h = wH;h i® wL;h = wL;h, and that
u(0;wL;h j L) ¸ u(mh;wH;h j L). Re-de¯ne k as the positive integer for which
u(mk;wH;k j H) is the highest, that is,
u(mk;wH;k j H) ¸ u(mh;wH;h j H); for all h:
If there is a tie, choose k so that wL;k is the highest among such maximizers
of u(mh;wH;h j H). We consider mutually exclusive and exhaustive subcases:
Subcase (3.1): wH;k · UH0(mk),
Subcase (3.2): wH;k > UH0(mk).
By de¯nition, rH ¸ wH;k. Subcase (3.2) is divided into three subsubcases:
Subcase (3.2.1): #Ik ¸ 2,
Subcase (3.2.2): #Ik = 1, say Ik = fikg, and there is k0 (6= k)
such that u(mk0;wH;k0 j H) = u(mk;wH;k j H) and Ik0 n fikg 6= ;.
Subcase (3.2.3): #Ik = 1, say Ik = fikg, and for any i 2 I nfikg
and any h for which Ih 3 i, u(mh;wH;h j H) < u(mk;wH;k j H).





L as in subcase (2.3).5
The next theorem says that in case (3), essentially the same conclusions as










5The number l is de¯ned as any positive integer such that u(ml;wH;l j H) is the
highest level achievable by the incumbents other than ik, UH;l is the indi®erence curve
of the type-H applicants that passes through (ml;wH;l). For each h, U
0
L;h is the in-






L;h is the indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants that
passes through (0;max frL;w0
L;hg). The integer k¤ is the speci¯c h 2 Jik at which
nL
³



















15THEOREM 3.7 Consider case (3), and let fg¤igi2I be a feasible strategy
bundle.
(i) In subcase (3.1), suppose #I ¸ 2, and
g
¤i(m) = w0; for all i 2 I and all m 2 M:








(¢); for all i 2 I:






wL;k if m = 0
wH;k if m = mk:




wL;k if m = 0
wH;k if m = mk;
and for some k0 (6= k) for which u(mk0;wH;k0 j H) = u(mk;wH;k j H),
9 ik0 2 Ik0 n fikg : g
¤ik0(m) =
(
wL;k if m = 0
wH;k0 if m = mk0;
9 i
0 2 I n fik;ik0g : g
¤i0
(m) = rL for all m 2 M:
(v) In subcase (3.2.3), suppose that there exists an integer p for which mk¤ ·















Lg if m = 0
UH;l(mk¤) if m = mk¤;




Lg if m = 0
UH;l(mp) if m = mp;
9 i
0 2 I n fik;ipg : g
¤i0
(m) = rL for all m 2 M:
Then, fg¤igi2I is a noncooperative equilibrium.
16The ¯nal proposition in this paper is intended to be the ¯rst step towards
characterizing the noncooperative equilibria. Let k be the positive integer
for which u(mk;wH;k j H) is the highest (this de¯nition is the same as before
for cases (1) and (2), but is di®erent from the earlier de¯nition for case (3)).








(¢); for all i 2 I:
4 PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 3.1 Choose any coalition structure ¹ P and any feasible
strategy ¹ gT for each T 2 ¹ P which keeps the applicants on the \job market,"
and de¯ne ¹ g :=
W
T2 ¹ P ¹ gT. Let ¹ mt be the message that the applicants of type
t send, given ¹ g, and let ¹ ¼i be a gain distributed to incumbent i. We need to
show that some coalition improves upon ( ¹ P; f¹ gTgT2P; f¹ ¼igi2I).
If ¹ g(¹ mt) > w for some type t 2 fL;Hg, then
X
i2I
¹ ¼i · nL(rL ¡ ¹ g(¹ mL)) + nH (rH ¡ ¹ g(¹ mH))
< nL(rL ¡ w) + nH (rH ¡ w):
So the grand coalition I can improve by adopting gI : m 7! w.
If on the other hand ¹ g(¹ mt) = w for each type t 2 fL;Hg,
X
i2I
¹ ¼i · nL (rL ¡ w) + nH (rH ¡ w):
If strict inequality holds true here, then the grand coalition can improve by
adopting ¹ g and a more e±cient gain distribution. So assume that equality
holds true. Then, there exists i0 2 I for whom ¹ ¼i0 > 0, and consequently for
each i 2 I n fi0g (6= ;),
¹ ¼i · nL (rL ¡ w) + nH (rH ¡ w) ¡ ¹ ¼i0:
Therefore the singleton fig forms, adopts strategy gi : m 7! w + ", where "
is a positive real number, attracts all the applicants, and obtains the entire
gain
nL(rL ¡ w ¡ ") + nH (rH ¡ w ¡ "):
17For " small enough, this gain is greater than ¹ ¼i.
In order to prove Theorems 3.2-3.5 and 3.7, we ¯rst establish lemmas:
LEMMA 4.1 Assume #I ¸ 2. Let fg¤igi2I be a noncooperative equilib-
rium, and let fn¤i
L;n¤i
Hgi2I be the associated assignment. For i 2 I and
t 2 fL;Hg for which n¤i
t > 0, let (m¤i
t ;g¤i(m¤i
t )) be i's o®ered contract that
is signed by type-t applicants.
(i) If n¤i
L > 0, then g¤i(m¤i
L) ¸ rL.
(ii) If n¤i
L > 0, then m¤i
L = 0.
(iii) If n¤i
L > 0 and n
¤j
L > 0, then g¤i(0) = g¤j(0).
(iv) If n¤i
H > 0, then g¤i(m¤i
H) · rH.
Proof (i) Suppose the contrary, i.e., suppose
9 i0 : n
¤i0
L > 0; and g
¤i0(m
¤i0
L ) < rL:
Denote by U¤
L the indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants that passes




L )). Notice that g¤i0(m
¤i0
L ) ¸ U¤
L(0), and
that the equality holds true i® m
¤i0
L = 0. Choose any " > 0, and de¯ne
w" := U¤





"(m) := max fg
¤i(m);w"g:
It su±ces to show that i can take away applicants from i0 and improve
upon the outcome of fg¤jgj2I. Since g¤i is Mi-measurable, so is gi
". Since
U¤




If i changes his strategy from g¤i to gi
" while the other incumbents h keep
their strategies g¤h, all type-L applicants will choose i's new contract (0;w"),
since














¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
:
So i increases his gain from the type-L applicants at least by
(
(nL ¡ n¤i
L)(rL ¡ w") + n¤i
L(¡"); if n¤i
L > 0;
nL (rL ¡ w"); if n¤i
L = 0:
18If, on the one hand, all type-H applicants also choose i's contract (0;w"),




L(0) for all j for which n
j
H > 0. If, on the other hand, no
applicant of type H switches his contract, then i's gain from the type-H
applicants remains constant. Therefore, by changing a strategy from g¤i to
gi
", i increases his gain at least by
(
(nL ¡ n¤i
L)(rL ¡ w") + (n¤i
L + nH)(¡"); if n¤i
L > 0;





L > 0, i strictly increases his gain for all " su±ciently close
to 0, contradicting the de¯nition of fg¤hgh2I as a noncooperative equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose the contrary, i.e., suppose
9 i0 : n
¤i0









L )). For each type t 2 fL;Hg, let I¤
t be the set of
incumbents whose contract is signed by type-t applicants, fi 2 I j n¤i
t > 0g.













L ) > U
¤
L(0):
Let k 2 I¤
H be the incumbent whose contract signed by type-H applicants
requires the least amount of education:





























L ) j L) ¸ u(m¤k
H ;g¤k(m¤k





L ) j H) · u(m¤k
H ;g¤k(m¤k
H ) j H), the assumption on the






19Since each applicant tries to minimize his education level given a wage
level, it follows that [m¤i
t ;m] 2 Mi. For two positive real numbers " :=







L(0) + "L if 0 · m < m¤k
H ;
g¤k(m¤k
H ) + "H if m¤k
H · m:
Strategy gk
" is Mk-measurable. For any ± > 0 su±ciently small, we may
choose " ¿ (±;±) so that
u(0;g
k






H ) j L)
u(0;g
k






H ) j H):
Strategy gk
" is intended to o®er contract (0;gk




H )) to type-H applicants. The preceding two inequalities
say that gk
" is indeed incentive-compatible. In the following, we choose such
".






















t := 0 and m¤i
t is arbitrary if i 62 I¤
t . When k changes his strategy
from g¤k to gk
", while the others keep their strategies, all the type-L applicants
come to k to sign contract (0;gk
"(0)) and all the type-H applicants also come
to k to sign contract (m¤k
H ;gk
"(m¤k
H )), so k's gain becomes
¼
k
" := nL (rL ¡ U
¤











































































































For " su±ciently small, A" > 0, so k's gain increases as he changes his strategy
from g¤k to gk
", contradicting the de¯nition of fg¤igi2I as an equilibrium.
(iii) If n¤i
L > 0 and n
¤j











¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
;
so g¤i(0) = g¤j(0)
(iv) If there exists i for whom n¤i
H > 0 and g¤i(m¤i









LEMMA 4.2 Assume #I ¸ 2, and let fg¤igi2I be a feasible strategy bundle.
In case (1), assume
8 i 2 I : g
¤i(¢) · UH0(¢);
9 ik 2 I : g
¤ik(0) = w0:
In subcases (2.1) and (2.2), assume








9 ik 2 Ik : g
¤ik(m) =
(
wL;k; if m = 0
wH;k; if m = mk:
In subcase (2.3), assume














Lg; if m = 0
UH;l(mk¤); if m = mk¤:
21Then, in cases (1) and (2), no incumbent i 6= ik can adopt a feasible strategy
g which takes applicants away from ik, and then eventually receive a nonneg-
ative gain.
Proof Let fg¤igi2I be the strategy bundle and let ik be the incumbent
given in the statement of the lemma. Suppose there exist i 2 I n fikg and
i's feasible strategy g such that i takes applicants away from ik, and then
eventually receives a nonnegative gain.
We ¯rst claim that g cannot attract only type-L applicants. Indeed, de-
note by (mi
L;g(mi
L)) the incumbent i's o®ered contract that type-L applicants








¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
> u(0;w0 j L);
so g(mi








¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
> u(0;wL;k j L);
so g(mi














L) > rL. In both cases (1) and (2), therefore, g(mi
L) > rL, conse-
quently (mi
L;g(mi
L)) yields a negative gain, and the claim was proved.
Therefore, g attracts some type-H applicants; let (mi
H;g(mi
H)) be i's














u(0;w0 j H); in case (1);
u(mk;wH;k j H); in subcases (2.1) and (2.2);
u(mk¤;UH;l(mk¤) j H); in subcase (2.3):
The contract (mi
H;g(mi
H)) then attracts all the type-H applicants in both
cases (1) and (2). Let UL be the indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants




L the number of type-L applicants who eventually sign a




. Then, 0 · ni
L · nL. We
22claim that ni
L < nL. If ni
L = nL, then denoting by (mi
L;g(mi
L)) the contract

















¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
= u(0;UL(0) j L);
so that g(mi




















Here, the last inequality is: a consequence of g(mi
H) > UH0(mi
H) in case
(1); a consequence of g(mi
H) > UH;k(mi
H) in subcases (2.1) and (2.2); and a
consequence of g(mi
H) > UH;l(mi
H) and i 2 I n fikg in subcase (2.3). Thus g
would eventually receive a negative gain, and the claim was proved.
Due to the claim, there exists j 6= i who eventually receives some type-




L) be j's o®ered contract signed by type-L
applicants. For j to survive, rL ¸ w
j
L. Then,
















¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
= u(0;UL(0) j L);
so that rL ¸ UL(0). Then, the three inequalities,



















are inconsistent. Thus, no incumbent i (6= ik) can choose a strategy which
takes applicants away from ik and then eventually receive a nonnegative gain.
Proof of Theorem 3.2 Let fg¤igi2I be the strategy bundle given in the
statement of the theorem. Choose i1 2 I. We need to show that i1 cannot
improve upon fg¤igi2I. Suppose that i1 changes his strategy from g¤i1 to gi1.
23In general, if an incumbent i designs a mechanism g to induce type-L
applicants to sign contract (mL;g(mL)) given fg;fg¤jgj6=ig, and if mL > 0,
then i can do better by another mechanism g0 such that the type-L applicants
would choose contract (0;g0(0)) and g0(0) < g(mL). Indeed, let UL be the
indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants which passes through (mL;g(mL)).
Since each applicant wants to minimize his education level given a wage
level, we may assume [mL;m] 2 Mi. In view of the assumption on the
slopes of the two types of indi®erence curves, if type-H applicants also sign
i's o®ered contract (mH;g(mH)), then (mL;g(mL)) · (mH;g(mH)). The




UL(0) if 0 · m < mL
g(m) if mL · m:
If, on the other hand, i is to induce only type-H applicants with his con-
tract (mH;g(mH)), then again without loss of generality, u(0;g(0) j L) ¸
u(mH;g(mH) j L).
Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that
8 m 2 M : u(0;g
i1(0) j L) ¸ u(m;g
i1(m) j L):
We can re-de¯ne UL as the indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants that
passes through (0;gi1(0)). The above inequality means UL(¢) ¸ gi1(¢).
Now, if gi1(0) > w0, then i1 attracts all the applicants of both types and
the gain becomes negative, so i1 cannot improve upon fg¤igi2I.
If gi1(0) < w0, then in view of UL(¢) ¸ gi1(¢), i1 loses all type-L applicants.
If i1 also loses type-H applicants, he becomes inactive, so he cannot improve
upon fg¤igi2I. Therefore, suppose there exists mH for which gi1(mH) >
UH0(mH). Then i1 attracts all type-H applicants, the other incumbents
su®er a loss from type-L applicants so drop out of the \market," and i1
eventually gets all applicants. But then he cannot make a positive gain in
case (1).
Suppose gi1(0) = w0. If i1 is to have a positive eventual gain, he has to
attract all the type-H applicants given fgi1;fg¤igi6=i1g. this means:
9 mH 2 M : g
i1(mH) > UH0(mH):
But then i1 attracts all type-H applicants, the other incumbents, as long as
they keep type-L applicants, su®er from a loss and drop out, so i1 eventually
24gets all the applicants of both types. In case (1), i1's eventual gain becomes
negative.
Proof of Theorem 3.3 Let fg¤igi2I be the strategy bundle given in the
statement of the theorem. Choose i1 2 Ik. In view of Lemma 4.2, it su±ces
to show that i1 cannot improve upon fg¤igi2I. Suppose that i1 changes his
strategy from g¤i1 to gi1. Let UL be the indi®erence curve of the type-L
applicants that passes through (0;gi1(0)). By the same argument as in the
second paragraph of the proof of Theorem 3.2, we may assume without loss
of generality that UL(¢) ¸ gi1(¢).
If gi1(0) > wL;k, then i1 attracts all the applicants of type L, and the gain
becomes negative (regardless whether i1 attracts type-H applicants or not)
because of the de¯nition of k, so i1 cannot improve upon fg¤igi2I.
If gi1(0) < wL;k, then i1 loses all type-L applicants. So in order for him
to stay active, gi1 has to attract all type-H applicants. If gi1(0) = wL;k,
in order to make a change for increase in his gain, i1 has to attract all the
type-H applicants. Thus, if gi1(0) · wL;k, which we assume in the rest of the
proof, i1 has to attract all type-H applicants given fg;fg¤igi6=i1g. Somebody
other than i1, say i2, is taking strategy g¤i2, which guarantees utility level
u(mk;wH;k j H) to the type-H applicants, and utility level u(0;wL;k j L) to
the type-L applicants. Since i1 has to supercede i2's guarantee to the type-H
applicants,
9 h : Ih 3 i1; and g
i1(mh) > UH;k(mh):
Incumbent i2, and possibly some members i 2 Infi1;i2g, receive only type-L
applicants (all type-L applicants, in case gi1(0) < wL;k). We consider two
cases separately: (A) rL < wL;k, and (B) rL = wL;k.
Suppose (A). Then those incumbents who received type-L applicants suf-
fer from a loss and drop out of the \market." As long as gi1(0) > rL, incum-
bent i1 eventually gets all applicants. But then i1's eventual gain becomes
negative, in view of the de¯nition of k. If gi1(0) · rL, then i1 may or may
not get all type-L applicants eventually, since somebody other than i1 and i2
may be able to keep type-L applicants. In case i1 eventually gets all type-L
applicants, his eventual gain is negative, in view of the de¯nition of k. In
case i1 does not get all type-L applicants eventually, his eventual gain is even
lower than in the situation in which he gets all type-L applicants, since each
type-L applicant brings in nonnegative gain. Thus, i1 cannot improve upon
fg¤igi2I in case (A).




mean that i1 receives a negative gain given fg;fg¤igi6=i1g, so he cannot sur-
vive.
Proof of Theorem 3.4 Let fg¤igi2I be the strategy bundle given in the
statement of the theorem. It su±ces to show that ik cannot improve upon
fg¤igi2I. Literally the same proof as the proof of theorem 3.3 (except that ik
replaces i1) applies.
Proof of Theorem 3.5 Let fg¤igi2I be the strategy bundle given in the
statement of the theorem. It su±ces to show that ik cannot improve upon
fg¤igi2I. Suppose ik changes his strategy from g¤ik to gik. Let UL be the
indi®erence curve of the type-L applicants that passes through (0;gik(0)).
Without loss of generality, UL(¢) ¸ gik(¢).
If gik(0) ¸ g¤ik(0) ¸ rL, then all type-L applicants stay with ik, con-
tributing a nonpositive gain, so ik has to keep all type-H applicants. Then
ik's eventual gain is no higher than that before his change of a strategy, in
view of the de¯nition of k¤. So ik cannot improve upon fg¤igi2I.
If gik(0) < g¤ik(0), then ik loses all type-L applicants, so in order to stay
active, the mechanism gik is designed so that it keeps all type-H applicants
given fgik;fg¤igi6=ikg. We consider two cases separately: (A) rL < w0¤
L (so
that g¤ik(0) = w0¤
L > rL), and (B) rL ¸ w0¤
L (so that g¤ik(0) = rL).
Suppose (A). Then incumbent ip, and possibly some members i 2 I n
fik;ipg, get all the type-L applicants, who bring in only a loss, so those
incumbents who receive type-L applicants eventually drop.
If gik(0) > rL, incumbent ik eventually takes back all the type-L appli-
cants. But then ik's eventual gain becomes no greater than his original gain
given fg¤igi2I, in view of the de¯nition of k¤.
If gik(0) < rL, then incumbent i0 eventually gets all the type-L applicants.
Incumbent ik eventually ends up only with the type-H applicants with a






· nH (rH ¡ UH;l(mh))
26= nL
³
rL ¡ max frL;g
ik(0)g
´
+ nH (rH ¡ UH;l(mh))
· (rL ¡ max frL;w
0¤
Lg) + nH (rHL ¡ UH;l(mk¤));
so ik cannot improve upon fg¤igi2I.
If gik(0) = rL, incumbent ik may get back some of the type-L applicants,
but they bring in only zero gain, so the above inequalities apply here as well;
ik's eventual gain becomes no greater than his original gain given fg¤igi2I.
Suppose (B). Then, ik, if he survives, eventually ends up only with the
type-H applicants. But ik's gain given fg¤igi2I comes only from the type-H
applicants, so as in the preceding two paragraphs, ik cannot improve upon
fg¤igi2I.
Sketch of Proof of Theorem 3.7 Let fg¤igi2I be the strategy bundle given
in the theorem. For subcase (3.1), choose any ik 2 I; for subcase (3.2.1), set
ik := i1; for the other subcases, ik is already de¯ned.
We ¯rst establish that no incumbent i 6= ik can adopt a feasible strategy
g which takes applicants away from ik, and eventually receive a nonnegative
gain. The proof follows closely the proof of Lemma 4.2. Here is an outline:
Suppose there exist an incumbent i 6= ik and his feasible strategy g such that
i takes applicants away from ik, and eventually receives a nonnegative gain.
As in the proof of Lemma 4.2, we claim that i cannot attract only type-L












u(0;w0 j H); in subcase (3.1);
u(mk;wH;k j H); in subcases (3.2.1)-(3.2.2);
u(mk¤;UH;l(mk¤) j H); in subcase (3.2.3).
Without loss of generality, [mi
H;m] 2 Mi. By de¯nition of k and by the
fact that i 6= ik, either (A) g(mi
H) > rH or else (B) nL (rL ¡ UL(0)) +
nH (rH ¡ g(mi
H)) < 0. If (A) is the case, i receives a loss from type-H
applicants, so he has to attract type-L applicants also. But the only way to
attract type-L applicants is to o®er a wage higher than rL (thereby receiving
a loss also from type-L applicants), in view of g¤ik(0) ¸ rL. So, i cannot
survive. If (B) is the case, the same argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.2
applies.
27We only need to show that ik cannot improve upon fg¤igi2I. Suppose ik
changes his strategy from g¤ik to gik. Let UL be the indi®erence curve of the
type-L applicants that passes through (0;gik(0)). Without loss of generality,
UL(¢) ¸ gik(¢).
Consider subcase (3.1). If gik(0) > w0, then the proof of Theorem 3.2
applies. If gik(0) · w0, then, as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, there exists
mH 2 M such that gik(mH) > UH0(mH). In subcase (3.1), this means either
(A) gik(mH) > rH, or else (B) nL (rL ¡ gik(0)) + nH (rH ¡ gik(mH)) < 0. If
(A) is the case, ik receives a loss from type-H applicants. In order to survive,
therefore, ik has to attract type-L applicants with wage gik(0) lower than rL,
but this is impossible in view of the fact that g¤i(0) = w0 ¸ rL for all i 6= ik.
If (B) is the case, the proof of Theorem 3.2 applies.
The idea of the proofs of the theorem for subcases (3.2.1)-(3.2.3) are the
same as above: We follow the proofs of Theorems 3.3-3.5. The only situation
in which we have to modify the proof is the case gik(mH) > rH (in which
case, it is possible that nL (rL ¡ gik(0)) + nH (rH ¡ gik(mH)) ¸ 0). But in
this situation ik receives a loss from type-H applicants, so in order for him
to receive a nonnegative eventual gain, he has to attract type-L applicants
with lower wage than rL, which is impossible in the presence of i0.
Proof of Proposition 3.8 Suppose that there exists a noncooperative
equilibrium fgigi2I for which
9 i
¤ 2 I : 9 m













H)gi2I be the associated assignment, and let It be the set of in-
cumbents i whose contract (mi
t;gi(mi
t)) is actually signed by some applicants
of type t 2 fL;Hg. By Lemma 4.1, gi(mi
H) · rH for all i 2 IH, mi
L = 0 for
all i 2 IL, and wL := gi(0) = gj(0) for all i;j 2 IL.
For i 2 IH, type-H applicants sign the contract (mi
H;gi(mi
H)), when they
could sign the contract (m¤;gi¤(m¤)), so

















¯ ¯ ¯ H
´
;
in short, each contract (mi
H;gi(mi
H)) is strictly above the indi®erence curves
UH;k and UH0, for all i 2 IH. For each i 2 IH, mi
H 2 f0;m1;m2;¢¢¢g, since
every applicant minimizes the needed education level. De¯ne w0i
















¯ ¯ ¯ L
´
:
28Choose any j 2 IL. Since type-L applicants sign the contract (0;wL)
rather than the contract (mi
H;gi(mi
H)) for any i 2 IH,















































In view of the present assumption, gi(mi
H) > max fUH;k(mi
H);UH0(mi
H)g for






































Thus, some active incumbents su®er from a loss, contradicting the de¯nition
of fgigi2I as a noncooperative equilibrium.
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Figure 4: subcase (2.3)
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